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Abstract 
We report the results of a public goods experiment using a design that enables us to 
directly measure individual response functions in voluntary contributions games and es­
timate error rates. In addition, following Andreoni (1988), we employ two treatments in 
order to measure the extent to which voluntary contribution is due to reputation effects. 
The partners treatment involves a fixed group of subjects playing a repeated game. The 
strangers treatment approximates a one-shot game by randomly changing group assign­
ments after each play. Our data shows that essentially the only difference between the 
two treatments is the amount of noise in the data, with the strangers treatment being the 
noisier of the two. This noise manifests itself in two distinct ways. First, there is more 
variation of decision rules across subjects in the strangers treatment. Second, individual 
behavior is, on average, less consistent with a cutpoint decision rule in the strangers treat­
ment, which produces higher estimates of individual error rates. The differences between 
the strangers and partners data are virtually the same as differences between data from 
experienced and inexperienced subjects. This suggests an explanation for the finding in 
Andreoni (1988) that there was greater contribution under the strangers treatment in 
the standard homogeneous environment in which one direction of errors ( undercontribu­
tion) are censored. Our results also support his conclusion that reputation effects do not 
appear to play a prominent role in repeated linear public goods voluntary contribution 
games. Many findings from past public goods experiments are consistent with our model 
of random variation in a population of subjects who are, on average, neither altruistic 
nor spiteful. 
Keywords: Voluntary contributions, public goods, experiments, reputation, learning, 
errors. 
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ALTRUISM, REPUTATION, AND NOISE IN LINEAR PUBLIC 
GOODS EXPERIMENTS* 
Thomas R. Palfrey Jeffrey E. Prisbrey 
1 Introduction 
The most common public goods experiment examines the extent to which contributions 
occur when individuals have a dominant strategy not to contribute. This mechanism 
of public good provision is called the voluntary contribution mechanism. In these ex­
periments, a subject, who is a member of a small group, is endowed with an amount 
of a good that may either be consumed privately or contributed to the public good of 
the group. Incentives are usually designed so that a self-interested subject has a strict 
dominant strategy to contribute nothing, but the efficient outcome for the group is for 
each subject to contribute all their input to the public good. 
A common finding in these experiments is that subjects often contribute, violating 
their dominant strategy. In addition, contribution rates have been found to be correlated 
with a number of treatment variables such as experience and induced preferences for 
the public good. However, to date there is no coherent theory that can account for 
the variety of findings that have been reported. A number of casual explanations for 
some of these findings have been offered in the literature, some suggesting a type of 
altruism contaminating the experimentally induced incentives,1 and/or that the subjects 
are trying to establish a reputation in order to influence play later in the experiment. 
In Palfrey and Prisbrey (1992) we proposed an alternative explanation, namely that 
most of the observed anomalies could be accounted for simply as background noise, and 
that the apperance of altruistic behaivor or stratigic reputation-building is illusionary or, 
*We acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation (SBR-9223701) and the
Ministerio de Education y Ciencia (DGICYT PB91-0810). We thank Estela Hopenhayn for assistance in 
preparing and conducting the experiments. Antonio Rangel helped with the translation of instructions 
from English. We are grateful to our colleagues at both Caltech and Pompeu Fabra for their advice, 
with special thanks to Antoni Bosch. 
1See the survey by Ledyard (1993) 
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at best, of minor importance in explaning the data. As a result of the usual experimen­
tal designs in which errors can only be manifested as overcontribution, the importance 
of systematic findings such as altruism and strategic play have been overstated. 2 To a 
limited extent, recent experiments have been conducted that lend some credence to this 
view,3 but a careful study that is designed to precisely measure the relative contribtuion 
of each of the various proposed explanations has not yet been carried out. Unfortunately, 
the typical experimental designs do not permit precise measurment of the separate con­
tribution of these diverse effects: altruism, reputation building, and noise. In this paper, 
we present the results of an experiment that was specifically designed to sort out these 
effects and accurately measure the separate contribution of each. 
A basic premise of our study is that individual behavior can be decomposed statis­
tically into a systematic component and a residual component. We call the systematic 
component a decision rule, and the residual component noise, or error. In the context of 
a linear voluntary contribution game it is natural to limit attention to very simple deci­
sion rules, called cutoff decision rules, in which an individual contributes if and only if his 
marginal rate of substitution between the private good and the public good is less than 
or equal to some critical value. This includes as a special case perfectly self-interested be­
havior ,4 where the critical value is 1. However, altruistic behavior or reputation-building
behavior would be consistent with decision rules where the critical value is set higher 
than 1. "Spiteful" behavior (Saijo and Nakamura 1993) corresponds to a critical value 
less than 1. The noise component of individual behavior is modelled as statistical de­
viation from a cutpoint rule. One way to think of this is that the observed decision 
rule of a subject has some random variation over time due to extraneous factors that 
are essentially impossible to measure. These factors would include computational errors, 
errors associated with learning-by-doing, and so forth. With this interpretation of the 
noise component, we expect experience to lead to a decrease in noise. 5 We interpret such
decreases in noise as evidence of learning. 
Past experimental designs make it virtually impossible to accurately identify the deci­
sion rule component from the noise component. In those experiments, there is little if any 
variation of the marginal rate of substitution. Typically, everyone has the same marginal 
rate of substitution throughout the experiment, and it is greater than 1. The focus of 
attention is on the aggregate frequency of violations of a deterministic version of the 
self-interest model of behavior. In the context of our non-deterministic two-component 
model of individual behavior, contribution could be due to altruism or reputation build­
ing or it could be due to noise. In those experiments, noise leads to systematic bias in 
the data, in that (at least relative to the self-interested model) only noise that leads to 
20vercontribution is small in magnitude or nonexistent in other public goods experiments where 
errors can be made in both directions. See Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988, 1991), and the references they 
cite. 
3See, for example, Andreoni (1988, 1992) and Saijo and Nakamura (1993). 
4Reputational play could also involve more complicated decision rules where the cutpoint changes 
over time or as a function of history. 
5Experience could also lead to adaptation of the decision rule, although we find little evidence for 
this. 
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contribution can possibly be observed. 
An accurate measurement of a subject's decision rule and the magnitude of the noise 
component is possible in a heterogeneous and changing environment; an environment 
where a subject faces a number of different marginal rates of substitution, and yet his 
information is otherwise the same. It is then possible, by a variety of methods (Palfrey 
and Rosenthal 1991), to estimate the subject's decision rule. As well as estimating the 
extent to which cutpoint rules deviate from 1, these methods also calibrate the noise 
component. The design reported here systematically varies each subject's marginal rate 
of substitution in order to estimate the distribution of decision rules and the distribution 
of the error rates. This allows us to measure the extent to which altruism or reputation 
builiding explains the commonly observed overcontribution and the extent to which these 
observations can be accounted for simply as noise. This also allows us to measure the 
extent to which players learn with experience. 
Once the noise component and the systematic component of individual choice behav­
ior have been separated, the next step is to break down the systematic component of 
decision rules and identify the relative importance of altruistic behavior and strategic 
reputation-building behavior. Following the approach of Andreoni (1988), we do this 
by conducting half of the experimental contribution games as a sequence of one-shot 
encounters with changing group memberships (the "strangers" treatment) and half the
contribution games as a sequence of encounters where group membership remains fixed 
(the "partners" treatment) .
The difference between the decision rule in a series of one time encounters and the 
decision rule in a similar number of encounters repeated within the same group could 
be attributed exclusively to reputation building. Accordingly a comparison between the 
decision rules measured under the two treatments is then made. If reputation-building 
is an important part of the explanation, we should observe decision rules with higher 
critical points in the partners treatment than in the strangers treatment. In addition, we 
should observe significantly more decay (declining contribution rates over the course of 
an experiment) in the partners treatment. The ability of our method to measure error 
rates means that we are able to draw firm conclusions about whether decay in previous 
experiments was due to learning or was evidence of reputation building. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevent findings 
from past experiments. Section 3 describes our experimental environment and the details 
of the design. Section 4 analyzes the data. We make concluding remarks in section 5. 
2 Previous Research 
The experimental study of public good provision by the voluntary contribution mecha­
nism has a history that is well detailed in Dawes (1980) and in Ledyard (1992). Almost 
all past research, including the influential works of Marwell and Ames (1979, 1980, 1981), 
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Issac and Walker (1988, 1989), Issac, Walker and Thomas (1984), and Andreoni (1988), 
examine situations in which each subject's marginal rate of substitution is fixed for all 
periods of the experiment, usually all subjects are assigned identical valuations. 
A number of general findings have emerged from the literature: 
• aggregate contribution rates range between 20 percent and 50 percent,
• at some point in time and in violation of dominant strategy incentives, nearly all
players contribute to the public good,
• there is a strong negative relationship between the marginal rate of substitution
and the rate of contribution, and
• contribution rates fall with repetition and with experience (where repetition rep­
resents a sequence of decisions within the same group, and experience represents
another similar sequence of decisions with a different group).
And, with regard to learning and reputation effects, Andreoni (1988) finds that: 
• subjects in repeated encounters contribute less to the public good than subjects in
� 
one time encounters, 
• the proportion of free riders, or subjects that consistently use the dominant strategy
decision rule, is greater in repeated encounters than in one time encounters, and,
• experience effects are greater for subjects in one-time encounters than for subjects
in repeated encounters.
A number of papers (Ledyard, 1993 and its references) have tried to attribute the 
contributions to altruism on the part of the subjects. It is argued that the experimentally 
induced monetary incentives do not fully control for all aspects of a subject's utility, and 
that utility may partly depend on the welfare or efficiency of the group outcome as well 
as monetary payoff. If the amount of consideration given to the group outcome is high 
enough, contribution to the public good is consistent with utility maximization. 
On the other hand, the presence of altruism does little to explain the counter-intuitive 
results in Andreoni (1988). After all, with the additional assumption of incomplete 
information, the ability to establish reputations is known, at least theoretically, to justify 
the use of dominanted strategies, see Kreps, et al. (1982). The work of Kreps, et al. 
suggests that, if anything, the contribution rates in repeated encounters should be higher, 
not lower, than the contribution rates in one time encounters. 
In addition to the systematic qualitative features of the data noted above, there is 
also a lot of statistical variation across trials. This suggests yet another explanation 
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which is simply that the data is noisy. 6 Because of the experimental designs that are 
used, "noise" (in the sense of statistical deviation from the theoretical prediction) can
only manifest itself as contribution. None of the past studies are designed to collect data 
that enables accurate measurement of the seperate effects of "noise" and "altruism" on 
voluntary contributions. 
Recently, Andreoni (1992) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1992) have designed experiments 
that do enable the differentiation. Andreoni proceeds by comparing data collected from 
a standard environment with data collected from a similar, environment in which group 
efficiency shall no longer be important to the individual. Andreoni attributes actions 
which help the group in the manipulated environment to "confusion," and he attributes 
the additional contribution in the standard environment to altruism. 
Building on Palfrey and Prisbrey (1992) we use a heterogeneous environment, in 
which each individual's marginal rate of substitution is varied over the course of an 
experiment. By observing a subject's decisions at a number of different marginal rates 
of substitution, instead of at just one, and by assuming that subjects make errors at 
some non-negative rate (possibly zero) , the subject's entire response function can be 
estimated. Using the separate techniques of probit and classification analysis, they are 
able to directly measure the rate of errors in the subject pool, and also directly measure 
contributions due to altruism. 
The research presented reexamines the surprising partners-strangers findings of An­
dreoni (1988) in the heterogeneous environment of Palfrey and Prisbrey (1992), and 
proposes an explanation consistent with his findings and findings in past experiments. 
This new explanation combines the "uncontrolled incentives" rationalization with a sta­
tistical model of subject decision errors. The design permits a separation of the three 
basic effects that have been hypothesized to explain voluntary contribution in experi­
ments; altruism, reputation building, and noise. It also allows direct measurement of 
experience effects. 
3 The Independent Private Values Environment 
Consider a group of N individuals, each with Xi, a divisible endowment of a private good, 
and a value for increments of the private good. Each individual must choose an amount 
of their endowment to keep and an amount to give to the public good. The utility of the 
individual is 
U(y, Xi) = Vy + TiXi, 
where V is the value of the public good, y is the amount of the public good produced by 
the entire group, ri is the individual's value for the private good, and Xi is the amount of
60ne can imagine many reasons for the data to be noisy: incomplete subject understanding of the 
rules; low payoff salience; boredom; experimenter effects; demand effects; etc. 
5 
the endowment that is kept for private use. The technology is such that, for every unit 
of the private good contributed, one unit of the public good is produced. 
By varying an individual's ri over a number of decision periods, it is possible to 
estimate that individual's decision rule, Di(ri/V), where ri/V is the individual's marginal 
rate of substitution. Theoretically, an individual's decision rule should be of the following 
form: 
if ri/V < 1 + ai + ci 
otherwise. 
where ai is individual i's level of altruism, and ci is a random error term. This type of 
decision rule is called a cutpoint rule and the value ci = 1 + ai is called the cutpoint.
Without the error term ci and as long as the game does not have an infinite number of 
decision periods, the above rule is the complete information dominant strategy decision 
rule. The inclusion of the error term accounts for the possibility of random errors or 
unpredictable behavior by subjects. 
Depending on the assumptions made about the distributions of ai and ci, it is possible 
to estimate the decision rules in a variety of ways. Possible assumptions about ai are: 
all individuals are have the same level of altruism and therefore the same ai, ai is never 
negative, or ai is drawn from some distribution. There are also many ways in which c:i 
can be distributed, some which assume all types of errors are equally likely and others 
which assume that drastic errors are less likely. 
We will offer two methods for estimating the decision functions. The first is to use an 
ordered probit analysis. The ordered probit analysis implicitly assumes that all the sub­
jects use the same decision rule and that the ci's are distributed in a Normal distribution 
with mean zero. The assumption of a Normal distribution makes drastic errors, (con­
tributing when ri/V is much larger than ci) , less likely than small errors (contributing 
when ri/V is close to ci) · The second method is non-parametric and is called a clas­
sification errors analysis. This method is used for the estimation of individual decision 
rules. 
4 Experimental Design 
All experiments were run using computers in the experimental economics lab at the 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. A copy of the instructions is in the appendix. The data was 
generated by four experimental sessions each containing four experiments. There were 
twelve first year, undergraduate, economics students who participated in each session, 
making a total of forty-eight. 
In all experiments, individuals were assigned to groups of four. They were given an 
endowment in the form of nine tokens and were told that they must choose to either 
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spend or keep these tokens. The subjects were then told how much each token was worth 
to them, in points, if they kept it. This value, which we called the token value, was 
randomly drawn from a Uniform distribution over the interval [1, 20]. Each token value 
in the group was the result of a different draw from the distribution, so group members 
likely had different token values-a fact which was carefully explained in the instructions. 
The token value is equivalent to ri. The subjects were also told that every member of 
their group, including themselves, would earn a specified amount (V, in our notation) 
for every token they spent. 
The subjects were told that they would be in four experiments, each of which had 
ten decision periods. The specified amount V depended upon the particular experiment; 
in the first two experiments of each session it was six points, in the last two experiments 
of each session it was ten points. 
In two of the sessions, which, following Andreoni (1988) we call Strangers, the subjects 
were randomly assigned new groups after each decision period. The random assignment 
process was used to approximate one time encounters. In the other two sessions, named 
Partners, the subjects were assigned to new groups only between each of the four ex­
periments. During a particular ten period experiment, the Partners were repeatedly in 
the same group. The subjects, of course, were told if their groups would be randomly 
changed between periods or if they would remain the same between periods. 
The subjects were then told the rate of exchange between cash and points, and quizzed 
before the experiments were run. After the experiments, each subject was paid anony­
mously in cash. 
This design enables us to examine experience effects, in addition to the effects of 
partnership. All the decisions in the first and the third experiment of each session are 
coded as inexperienced decisions. The rationale for this division is that in the first and 
third experiments, the subjects see a particular public good value for the first time. In 
the second and fourth experiments in each session, the subjects see a public good value 
for the second consecutive time, and these decisions are coded as experienced. No subject 
participated in more than one session. 
5 Analysis of the Data 
The data analysis centers on the measurement of subject decision rules and is specifically 
organized around the measurement of cutpoint rules and error rates. 
5.1 Aggregate Data - A Simple Classification Analysis 
As the first cut at measurement, we estimate a common cutpoint, c, and common error 
rate, c, which best describes the aggregate data. The analysis proceeds by determining 
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the rate of classification errors in the data for each possible cutpoint. A decision is 
classified as an error if, under the hypothetical cutpoint rule, a subject was supposed to 
contribute a token, i. e. the subject had a value ri/V which was strictly less than the 
hypothetical cutpoint, and the subject did not contribute the token. A classification error 
can also occur if, under the hypothetical cutpoint rule, the subject was not supposed to 
contribute a token and the subject did contribute the token. The estimated common 
cutpoint, c*, is the one with the least classification errors and the estimated common
error rate, c:*, equals the rate of classification errors if c* is the cutpoint.
Figures 1 and 2 show the number of classification errors as a function of the hypo­
thetical cutpoint, and illustrate the effects of reputation and experience, respectively. In 
every case, the theoretical cutpoint with the lowest rate of classification errors is c* = 1,
which is consistent with the joint hypothesis of (a) homogeneity of subject decision rules 
and (b) no altruism in the subject pool. Based on this sample analysis, subjects maximize 
utility, and occasionally make errors. 
Next consider the hypothesis suggested by the reputational model, that subjects in 
one time encounters have a lower cutpoint than subjects in repeated encounters. Figure 1 
shows that the c* in the Strangers condition is equal to the c* in the Partners condition, so
the reputation hypothesis is not supported. Using this method of decision rule estimation, 
there is absolutely no evidence of a reputation effect. 
On the other hand, the data show support for an alternative "noise" hypothesis to 
account for the differences between the strangers and partners data: subjects in one time 
encounters have a higher error rate than subjects in repeated encounters. The data also 
show that experience reduces error rates (Figure 2). 
The graphical presentation is further reinforced by a least squares regression with the 
average group error rate per round, assuming that all subjects use a cutpoint of 1, as 
the dependent variable. The regression contains four independent variables: a constant; 
PART, which is 1 for data from the Partners treatment and 0 for data from the Strangers 
treatment; EXPER, which is 1 for data from experienced subjects and 0 otherwise; and 
PER, which runs form 1 to 10 and is the number of the period. The results of the 
regression are in Table 1. 
The variable PART is negative and significant, reflecting the lower average error rates 
in repeated encounters. The variable EXPER is also negative and significant, reflecting 
the lower error rates in experiments with experienced subjects. The regression also shows 
that error rates fall over a 10 round session since the coefficient on PER is negative and, 
for a one-tailed test, significant. 
5.2 Aggregate Data - An Ordered Probit Analysis 
An alternative approach is ordered probit analysis (McKelvey and Zavonia, 1975). Again, 
homogeneity of subject decision rules is assumed i.e., every subject has the same cutpoint 
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and error rate. The difference is that the error term, cit is assumed to be independently 
distributed across periods and subjects with a Normal distribution with a mean of zero 
and a variance of one. Hence contributing when r /V is much larger than c* is less likely
than contributing when r /V is near to c*. 
The ordered probit analysis estimates the probability of any number of tokens being 
contributed as a function of the marginal rate of substitution. It is easy to measure the 
impact of reputation, experience and time with the addition of dummy variables and a 
time trend. The dependent variable in the analysis, then, is the subject's decision, a 
number from 0 to 9. The independent variables are: a constant; r/V; PART and PARTS 
which are, respectively, constant and slope7 dummies for the partners treatment; EXPER 
and EXPERS which are, respectively, constant and slope dummies for experience effects; 
and LATE and LATES which are, repsectively, constant and slope dummies for decay 
effects8 over a 10-period session. 
We calculate a probit response curve equal to the predicted percentage of tokens 
contributed as a function of r /V and plot this curve for several of the treatments in 
Figure 3. To do this we first compute a "score" for each value of r /V, that determines 
the location of the mean of a Normal density function on a line divided into intervals by 
the probit-generated threshold values. In the present situation there are nine intervals, 
one interval for each of the possible decisions, 0-9. The area under the density and 
between the thresholds n and n - 1 is equivalent to the estimated probability that event 
n occurs. A curve which gives the expected contribution as a function of r /V can then 
be generated. 
It should be noted that changes in the coefficients of the slope dummies will change 
the steepness of the expected contribution curve as well as its position relative to the 
x-axis, whereas changes in the coefficients of the intercept dummies will change only the 
position of the resulting curves with regard to the x-axis. 
Recall that, theoretically, the subjects should use a cutpoint decision rule. There 
should be an c such that the probability of contribution if r /V < c is one and the 
probability of contribution if r /V > c is zero. If the subjects behaved in a way that was 
perfectly consistent with the theory and made no errors, their decision rule would be 
graphed as a step function which stepped from nine to zero at the cutpoint. 
If the subjects do not adhere perfectly to a cutpoint decision rule the estimated curve 
would not be a step function, but would be S shaped. The more mistakes that were 
made, the flatter the curve would become. The cutpoint would be equal to the point 
at which they were indifferent between contributing and keeping their tokens or where 
the probability of contribution is 0.5. The expected contribution at the cutpoint, then, 
should be equal to half of the endowment, or 4.5 tokens. 
7Slope dummies are the product of the dummy variable and r/V. 
8Recall that past experiments have observed that contribution rates decay over a 10-period session. 
The dummy variable LATE is 0 in rounds 1-5 and 1 in rounds 6-10. 
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Refer again to Figure 3. Notice the proximity of the estimated cutpoints in each 
treatment. The cutpoints from the inexperienced treatments are almost identical as 
are the cutpoints from the experienced treatments. Furthermore, all four cutpoints are 
very close (within . 05) to one and all four response curves intersect at one point, where 
MRS = 1. The main difference between the curves is in their slopes. The steepest curve 
comes from the Partners with experience treatment, the next from the Partners with no 
experience, the next from the Strangers with experience, and the flattest curve is from 
the Strangers with no experience treatment. These observations are consistent with the 
results of the previous section. 
Both variables PART and PARTS are significant, but the significance does not support 
the hypothesis that repeated play leads to greater contribution. In both the experienced 
and the inexperienced treatment, the subjects in one time encounters have a higher cut­
point than subjects in repeated encounters, although the difference is small in magtitude, 
less than .05 percent. 
The fact that PARTS is significant indicates that there is more noise in the one­
shot treatments then in repeated encounters. The subjects in one time encounters have 
flatter expected contribution curves and therefore have a higher error rate. The variable 
EXPERS is significant and lends support to the hypothesis that experience reduces noise. 
The inexperienced subjects have flatter expected contribution curves and therefore have 
a higher error rate. The experience subjects also have a slightly lower cutpoint. The 
positive coefficient on EXPER compensates for this downward shift, so that the estimated 
cutpoint for the experienced subjects is almost identical to the inexperienced subjects' 
cutpoint. The coefficients on LATE and LATES mirror these results, indicating that the 
effect of the 10-period repetition is similar to experience effects. The response curves 
are steeper in the last half of a 10-period session than in the first half, but the overall 
contribution rate is essentially unchanged. 9 At first glance, this would seem to contradict 
past findings of significant delay. But in fact, there is no contradiction at all. It simply 
means that the observed decay in past experiments was due to learning, not reputation, 
a finding that was observed by past designs in which over contribution due to error is 
difficult to separate from over contribution for other reasons.10 
This lack of reputation effects is further illustrated in Table 3, where the effect of 
PART and LATE on average contributions is cross-tabulated. Reputation effects would 
predict more decay in the partners treatment than in the strangers treatment. In fact, 
the opposite is observed (although the difference is not statistically significant at the 
5 percent level). 
Finally, consider the ordered probit model using only data from the last rounds of 
every experiment (Table 2). Theoretically, there should be no difference between the 
9The average contribution rate in rounds 1-5 is 3.583 and the average contribution rate in rounds 
6-10 is 3.585. 
10If we censor all our observations with MRS< 1, then indeed we also measure significant decay that
is large in magnitude. 
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partners and strangers in these rounds. There is no chance for further reputation build­
ing. This is what we find. None of the variables outside of the constants and r /V are 
significant, and all except PARTS have coefficients that are much smaller in magnitude. 
5.3 Individual Data - Classification Analysis 
The analysis above is carried out under the maintained hypothesis of homogeneity of 
subject decision rules. 
In this section, we apply the simple classification analysis of section 5. 1 at the indi­
vidual level. By doing so, we are able to estimate a distribution11 of cutpoints across the 
entire subject pool. From these estimated cutpoints, we can compute error rates for each 
individual as the percentage of decisions that violate their estimated cutpoint rule. The 
distributions of error rates and the distribution of cutpoints are then compared across 
treatments. 
5.3.1 The distribution of individual cutpoints 
Figure 4 displays the distribution of estimated individual cutpoints across the 192 obser­
vations.12 It is clear from this figure that the distribution 13 is centered at O (i.e. , Nash 
cutpoints) and is nearly symmetric. The median cutpoint is 0 and accounts for approxi­
mately 30 percent of the observations. Two thirds of the observations range from -3 to 
+3, with the remaining one-third evenly divided below -3 and above +3. Three quarters 
of the observations range from -4 to +4, again with the remainder being evenly divided 
between large negative and large positive cutpoints. 
If we break down the distribution of cutpoints by the partners/strangers treatment, 
we find a systematic effect, but not what one would expect from the hypothesis that re­
peated groups have "reputation effects" that lead to more contribution. The reputation 
hypothesis predicts that repeated groups will have cutpoints that are typically higher 
than the cutpoints in the one-shot treatment. We do not find this. The average or me­
dian cutpoint in both treatments equals 0. The difference between the two distributions 
is that the distribution for strangers is more dispersed than the distribution for partners. 
This is illustrated in Figure 5 which displays the empirical cumulative frequencies sepa­
rately for the strangers data and the partners data. As one can see, the distribution for 
11 Rapoport (1987) has argued that heterogeneity may be an important ingredient of a complete 
explanation for behavior in other (step-level) public goods environments. Isacc, Walker, and Thomas 
(1984) and Ledyard (1993) make similar points. 
12For each of our 48 subjects we report four separate "observations" corresponding to the four treat­
ments that a subject participated in: low-V-inexperienced, low-V-experienced, high-V-inexperienced, 
and high-V-experienced. Recall that each subject participated in four different groups of four, the first 
two with one level of V and the second two with another level of V. 
13Deviations from Nash cutpoints are measured in token value units. A cutpoint of 0 corresponds to 
MRS = 1 in earlier figures. In a few of the observations, more than one hypothetical cutpoint minimized
classification errors. Such ties were broken by choosing the one closest to 0. 
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strangers looks like a mean-preserving spread of the distribution for partners. Also, both 
distributions are symmetric about the Nash prediction of a 0 cutpoint. 
5.3.2 The distribution of classification errors 
From the above classification analysis, we can obtain estimates for the distribution of 
classification errors across individuals. Figure 6 displays the empirical distribution of er­
ror rates across the 192 observations, where the error rate is computed as the fraction of 
an individual's decisions (within one treatment) that are misclassified according to that 
individual's estimated cutpoint. Figures 7 and 8 show the effect of experience and part­
nership, respectively. The effect of experience is very similar to the effect of partnership. 
In both cases, there is a leftward shift in the error rate distribution, indicating fewer 
errors with experience, and fewer errors in the partners treatment than in the strangers 
treatment. 
There is also evidence from the joint distribution of error rates and cutpoints indi­
cating that the distribution of classification errors may be less dispersed than Figures 4 
and 5 suggest. Figure 6 displays the average error rates as a function of how far the esti­
mated cutpoint is from 0 (perfect Nash behavior). The error rates are sharply increasing 
as a function of deviation from Nash play. Subjects who are estimated as Nash players 
have an error rate less than .05, while subjects that have a one token-value unit deviation 
from Nash play have twice that error rate. Observations of 5 or more unit deviations 
from the Nash cutpoint have more than triple that error rate. A possible explanation for 
this is that subjects with high estimated deviations from Nash play have high estimated 
error rates because they are learning, and adjusting their cutpoint decision rule over time. 
This is hard to verify directly since we do not have enough data to estimate reliably a 
trend in individual cutpoint rules. Such a finding could also be the (spurious) result of 
heterogeneity in individual error rates, since in small samples subjects with high error 
rates will produce cutpoint estimates with higher variance. 
6 Conclusions 
The results in this paper point to a new interpretation of observed violations of dominant 
strategies to free ride in voluntary contributions experiments. The explanation we suggest 
is not that subjects are on average either particularly altruistic nor particularly spiteful. 
Furthermore, consistent with Andreoni (1988) we find no evidence of reputational effects 
of the sort proposed in Kreps and Wilson (1982). Rather, subjects exhibit statistical 
fluctuations in their decision making, that manifests itself as random noise14 in the data. 
This explanation is consistent with the analysis we conduct, both at the aggregate level 
and at the individual level. 
14Presumably these statistical fluctuations are not purely random from the point of view of a subject 
making the decision. 
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How does such an explanation account for the apparently altruistic behavior in past 
experiments where subjects have a dominant strategy to free ride? The answer is sim­
ple. In those experiments, the design automatically censors all observations of subjects 
who have a dominant strategy to give, but end up free riding. In other words, in past 
experiments, the only kind of "error" relative to Nash theory that could be observed 
was seemingly altruistic behavior. If one re-examines our data censoring all observations 
of MRS < 1 (dominant strategy to give) , then one finds aggregate contribution rates
that are statistically significant, and of a magnitude comparable to what has been found 
in these other studies. Moreover, as in Andreoni (1988) we find more contribution in 
the strangers treatment than in the partners treatment. We are able to show that this 
difference is due to factors affecting the variance in subjects' decisions and decision rules, 
not a systematic tendency of mean behavior away from the Nash equilibrium. A similar 
explanation applies to the Saijo and Nakamura (1993) experiments where subjects have 
a dominant strategy to give in, but substantial free riding is observed. The observation 
that experience reduces violations is just a manifestation of experience producing lower 
error rates and lower subject variation. 
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Appendix 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in decision making. You will be paid in cash at the end of the 
experiment. The amount of money you earn will depend upon the decisions you make and 
on the decisions other people make. We request that you do not talk at all or otherwise 
attempt to communicate with the other subjects except according to the specific rules of 
the experiment. If you have a question, feel free to raise your hand. One of us will come 
over to where you are sitting and answer your question in private. 
The session you are participating in is broken down into a sequence of four separate 
experiments. Each experiment will last 10 rounds. At the end of the last experiment, 
you will be paid the total amount you have accumulated during the course of all 4 
experiments. Everyone will be paid in you in private and you are under no obligation to 
tell others how much you earned. Your earnings are given in points. At the end of the 
last experiment, you will be paid 10 pesetas for every 100 points you have accumulated 
during the course of all four 
In each experiment you will be divided into 3 groups of 4 persons each. Those groups 
will stay the same for all 10 rounds of the experiment. After each 10 round experiment, 
everyone will be regrouped into 3 entirely new groups. Therefore, whenever we change 
groups, the other people in your group will be different from the last group you were in. 
You will not be told the identity of the other members in your group. Since we will be 
running 4 experiments tonight, you will be assigned 4 different groupings, one for each 
10 round experiment. 
Each round of the experiment you will have 9 tokens. You must choose how many of 
these tokens you wish to keep and how many tokens you wish to spend. The amount of 
money you earn in a round depends on how many tokens you keep, how many tokens you 
spend, and how many tokens are spent by others in your group. Each round, you will 
be told how many points each token is worth if you keep it. This amount is called your 
TOKEN VALUE and it will change from round to round and will vary from person to 
person randomly. To be more specific, in each round, your token value is equally likely 
to be anywhere from 1 to 20 points. There is absolutely no systematic or intentional 
pattern to your token values or the token values of anyone else. The determination of 
token values across rounds and across people is entirely random. Therefore, everyone in 
your group will generally have different token values. Furthermore, these token values 
will change from round to round in a random way. You will be informed PRIVATELY 
what your new token value is at the beginning of each round and you are not permitted 
to tell anyone what this amount is. 
After being told your token value, you must wait at least 10 seconds before making 
your decision of how many tokens to spend and how many to keep. Your keyboard will 
be frozen for this period of time. When everyone has made a decision, you are told how 
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many tokens were spent in your group and what your earnings were for that round. This 
will continue for 10 rounds. Following each round you will begin with 9 new tokens and 
you will be randomly assigned a new token value between 1 and 20 points. 
PAYOFFS 
You will receive 3 points times the total number of tokens spent in your group. In 
addition, you will also receive your token value times the number of tokens you keep. 
Notice that this means every time anyone in your group spends a token, everyone in 
the group (including the spender) gets an additional 3 points, but the spender forgoes 
his or her token value for that token. WHAT HAPPENS IN YOUR GROUP HAS NO 
EFFECT ON THE PAYOFFS TO MEMBERS OF THE OTHER GROUPS AND VICE 
VERSA. Therefore, in each round, you have the following possible earnings, as shown in 
the table: 
[WRITE EARNINGS TABLE ON BOARD] 
Earnigs Table 
YOUR SPENDING DECISION OTHERS YOUR EARNINGS (in points) 
0 N tokens (N*3) + (9*your token value) 
1 N tokens 3 + (N*3) + (8*your token value) 
2 N tokens 6 + (N*3) + (7*your token value) 
3 N tokens 9 + (N*3) + (6*your token value) 
4 N tokens 12 + (N*3) + (5*your token value) 
5 N tokens 15 + (N*3) + (4*your token value) 
6 N tokens 18 + (N*3) + (3*your token value) 
7 N tokens 21 + (N*3) + (2*your token value) 
8 N tokens 24 + (N*3) +your token value 
9 N tokens 27 + (N*3) 
Here is an example: Suppose everyone else in your group spends 13 tokens in all and you 
spend 4 tokens and your token value was 12. You would earn 12 + 39 + 60 = 111 points. 
If you had spent 3 tokens you would have earned 9 + 39 + 72 = 120 points. If you had 
spent 5 tokens you would have earned 15 + 39 + 48 = 102 points. 
Are there any questions? [ANSWER QUESTIONS] 
[Two practice rounds. Tell them not to press any keys unless you tell them to. In 
round 1 have each subject spend the number of tokens equal to the last digit of their 
ID#. In round 2 have each subject KEEP the number of tokens equal to the last digit 
of their ID#. Go over screen display and history. Tell subjects to refrain from pressing 
keys for no reason. ] 
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[Keep screen display on] 
[Hand out quiz. ] 
[Correct quiz answers and read them aloud. ] 
[Answer any additional questions. ] 
[Begin expe�iment l. ] 
Specific instructions for Experiment 2: 
Experiment 2 is the same as experiment 1 except now everyone in a group receives 6 
points times the number of spenders in their group. Again, in addition, nonspenders also 
receive their token values. Again, everyone has been reassigned to a new group with a 
new set of participants. Here is your new payoff table: 
[CHANGE BOARD. EXPLAIN. ] 
Example: Suppose everyone else in your group spends 13 tokens in all and you spend 4 
tokens and your token value was 12. You would earn 24 + 78 + 60 = 162 points. If you 
had spent 3 tokens you would have earned 18 + 78 + 72 = 168 points. If you had spent 5 
tokens you would have earned 30 + 78 + 48 = 156 points. 
Specific instructions for Experiment 3: 
Experiment 3 is the same as experiments 1 and 2 except now everyone in a group receives 
10 points times the number of spenders in their group. Again, in addition, nonspenders 
also receive their token values. Again, everyone has been reassigned to a new group with 
a new set of participants. 
[CHANGE BOARD. EXPLAIN. ] 
Example: Suppose everyone else in your group spends 13 tokens in all and you spend 4 
tokens and your token value was 12. You would earn 40 + 130 + 60 = 230 points. If you 
had spent 3 tokens you would have earned 30 + 130 + 72 = 232 points. If you had spent 
5 tokens you would have earned 50 + 130 + 48 = 228 points. 
[Begin experiment 3.] 
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Specific instructions for Experiment 4: 
Experiment 4 is the same as experiments 1, 2 and 3 except now everyone in a group 
receives 15 points times the number of spenders in their group. Again, in addition, 
nonspenders also receive their token values. Again, everyone has been reassigned to a 
new group with a new set of participants. 
[CHANGE BOARD. EXPLAIN. ] 
Example: Suppose everyone else in your group spends 13 tokens in all and you spend 4 
tokens and your token value was 12. You would earn 60 + 195 + 60 = 315 points. If you 
had spent 3 tokens you would have earned 45 + 195 + 72 = 312 points. If you had spent 
5 tokens you would have earned 75 + 195 + 48 = 318 points. 
[Begin experiment 4.] 
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Regression on Average Errors 
one 0. 24140
(15.24312) 
PART? -0.03541 
(-2.88723) 
EXP ER -0.03287 
(-2.67963) 
PER -0.00403 
(-1.88879) 
No. of Obs. 160 
R2 0. 10900[?,2 0.09186 
Table 1: A least squares regression with the average error rate per round, across subjects 
as the dependent variable. 
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All Rounds Last Round 
one 1.57 1.80 
(16.27) (6.01) 
r/V -.66 -.81 
(-11.00) (-4.42) 
PARTS -. 18 -. 18 
(-2.81) (-0.84) 
PART . 17 .03 
(1. 73) (.08) 
EXPERS -. 15 -. 11 
(-2.37) (-.52) 
EXP ER . 15 .01 
(1.48) (.04) 
LATES -. 18 
(-2.86) 
LATE . 18 
(1. 76) 
Ai . 29 .31 
(19.61) (6.38) 
A2 .55 .59 
(38. 17) (14.16) 
A3 .77 .76 
(59.52) (20.93) 
A4 . 93 .90 
(75.23) (28.61) 
A5 1.09 .99 
(98. 05) (33.66) 
A5 1. 19 1.09 
(105.62) (31.52) 
A1 1.35 1.26 
(95.63) (27.25) 
As 1.57 1.49 
(74. 11) (20.87) 
ln lik -3303.2 -325. 17 
N 1920 192 
Table 2: Ordered Probit Analysis: The dependent variable is the number of tokens 
contributed. Under each coefficient is the asymptotic t-statistic. The log likelihood and 
sample size are also given. 
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partners strangers 
early 3.39 3.78 
(t = 1 - 5) 
late 3.53 3.64 
(t = 6 - 10) 
Table 3: Mean contribution (out of nine tokens) as a function of LATE and PART. 
N = 480 in each cell. 
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CUTPOINT ANALYSIS 
UPF Data 
Partners vs. Strangers 
Fraction of Decisions Misclassified 
OJr--����������������-,
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0. 1
0 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3 .5 4 4.5 5 5 .5 6 6.5 7 
Hypothetical Cutpoint 
� Strangers � Partners
Figure 1 
21 
CUTPOINT ANALYSIS 
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Ordered Probit Analysis 
Partners effects and Experience effect 
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Figure 3: The expected contribution as a function of r /V as estimated by Ordered Pro bit 
1fodel. 
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